in “Notes on the Palaeography of the Old Tibetan Inscriptions: Zhol and bSam yas.” Finally, with characteristic virtuosity, Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp’s argument for and demonstration of the importance of rigorous text-critical practice for Tibetologists too eager to supplement that practice with theory should not be missed.

In line with previous publications by Indus in this series, this volume is a collection of highly specialized studies that will no doubt appeal to only a select audience. Perhaps in anticipation of this, there is little effort to standardize presentations of Tibetan technical terms, or even in many cases to translate such commonplace terminology as *phyi dar* (“period of later dispensation”). As a result, the volume potentially alienates a broader spectrum of readers from other scholarly disciplines whose insights Tibetology could no doubt profit from, and who certainly could have been provided easier access with alternative editorial decisions and a larger introduction. That said, this rich body of research holds the promise that more cross-disciplinary conversations will appear in the future, and that the study of the complex subject of the edition in Tibet might, in the words of Anne Chayet, truly begin to “réunir les chercheurs intéressés par ces thèmes, croiser les disciplines dont ils se réclament, comparer les methodes et donc, d’une façon générale, en regroupant les recherches, leur donner une impulsion nouvelle” (pp. 10–11).

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The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal. By Raffaele Torella. Translated by Kenneth Frederick Hurry. Varanasi: Indica Books, 2011. Pp. 269.

One can only welcome K. F. Hurry’s English translation of Raffaele Torella’s masterly introduction to classical and medieval Indian philosophy, whose Italian original (*Il pensiero dell’India: Un’introduzione.* Rome: Carocci Editore) was published in 2008. For this book is much more than a new doxographic account of Indian philosophy. Reflecting more than thirty years of Torella’s creative and exemplary interaction with philosophical and non-philosophical Sanskrit literature, this introduction abounds in insightful observations and new materials on the nature, the sociocultural background, the “archaeology,” and the historiography of Indian philosophy. Besides a very learned introduction (pp. 7–32), the book comprises two main parts: “Brahmanic Philosophy and Environs” (pp. 33–120) and “Opponents of Brahmanic Culture: The Materialism of the Lokāyatas, Jainism and Buddhism” (pp. 121–71). A fourfold “Excursus” (“The Form of the Texts,” pp. 173–79; “Logic,” pp. 180–83; “Knowledge and Truth,” pp. 184–88; “Linguistic Speculations,” pp. 189–96), two appendices (“Orality and Writing,” pp. 197–211; “From the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*: The Pratyabhijñā-Darśana,” pp. 212–23), a bibliography (pp. 225–50), and three indices (pp. 251–69) round out the volume.

The book’s introduction deals with the various (Western as well as Neo-Hindu) prejudices responsible for the denial of anything like “genuine” philosophy in ancient India. With most critics, Torella admits that no Sanskrit word (except perhaps the rare *tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*) provides a satisfactory equivalent of ‘philosophy’ or ‘philosopher’: *darśana* (rather than being philosophy is a “world view,” p. 15; see below), *ānvīkṣikī* (rather than philosophy, “a wider critical and investigative attitude that perennially tests the validity of the rules regulating human activities,” p. 16), *parīkṣaka* (rather than a philosopher, “one who questions things instead of accepting them,” p. 17). In this connection, the author engages in a stimulating discussion of the Neo-Hindus’ emphasis on direct personal experience and the transformative character of Indian philosophy as *darśana*, and argues that this understanding of *darśana* is irrelevant for classical and medieval facts “since those connotations of the immediacy of personal experience and the all-inclusiveness they wished to attribute are alien to it” (p. 15). Similarly, he is ready to grant the absence of “pure theory” (together with “axiological neutrality” and the search for universal truths, one of the defining features of “philosophy” according to Husserl) in Indian philosophical literature, which more often than not is to be read within “ethical-religious contexts” and against the background of “soteriological-devotional preoccupation[s]” (p. 18). Note, however, that

according to the author (p. 29), "the western critic himself is increasingly aware that 'pure' theory, free from conditioning, which by contrast is claimed to characterise western thought, is in actual fact nourished and guided by unconscious paradigms, and inevitably conditioned by contexts and cultural models." Does, then, the lack of personal flavor and impulse (notwithstanding Dharmakīrti, Jayarāśi, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, pp. 20–21), of "any search for truth without some kind of pre-established directions," as well as the "virtual absence of conversion" (p. 18; note Torella's discussion of Maṇḍana Miśra, Śaṅkaranandana, and Vācaspati Miśra, pp. 19–20), plead against the existence of philosophy in ancient and medieval India? The answer to this question provides Torella with an opportunity to discuss the central notion of *śāstra*—one of the most penetrating parts of the book (pp. 21–26). Finally, is "Indian philosophy" something like a *contradictio in terminis* due to the apparent conditioning of speculation by (mostly Vedic) revelation? Certainly not, for "[i]n actual fact, the nature and results of this stated dependence on Vedic revelation probably have much less impact than western critics may fear" (p. 28; after all—the remark bears on Kumārila—"in the works of Indian philosophers, rarely does one see such an extensive and sophisticated use of rational argument as in this very champion of the Veda's authority," p. 26). This is the occasion to discuss the questions of (the *śāstrakāra*s' attitude toward) history (pp. 25–26), of the mainly commentarial nature of Indian philosophical literature (p. 25), and of the relationships between reason(ed argument) and scripture (pp. 26–29).

After several publications aimed "at refuting [the] mythical vision [. . .] of an ataraxic and disembodied India" (p. 7 n. 1), of "a land of boundless riches and lasciviousness" (p. 7 n. 2), Torella attempts to present "an India that was different from the usual *mystical* India" (p. 7) by "abstracting as far as possible the religious and soteriological dimension" (p. 7) of the philosophical systems and focusing on "a prevalently ontological-logical-epistemological scenario" (p. 137): "[P]artially following doxographic tradition, our presentation of the *darśana*s turns particularly on 'philosophic' themes, leaving religious components aside as far as possible. [. . .] The main, closely interconnected themes are: the nature of the real, causality, the means of valid knowledge, language and verbal knowledge" (p. 32). Indeed, if doxography presents "each *darśana* [. . .] as [if] it were embalmed in a definitive form, unaccompanied by any reconstruction of its formation process" (p. 30), this book (which, according to its author, is "not a manual," p. 8) goes far beyond a genre to which Western scholarship has very little to add to Haribhadra and Mādhava. True, the author's starting point remains the so-called *darśana*s, defined here—against Neo-Hindu interpretations (see above)—as "coherent presentation[s] of a body of theories mainly concerning the nature of the real and the conditions of knowing it, integrated by concepts of an ethical-religious nature" (p. 15). But these are envisioned as doctrinal systems reflecting broader cultural interests, involved in history, interacting with their concurrents by way of polemics and/or influence, and changing in spite of their strong capacity to "obscure any diachronic perspective" (p. 23). The presentation of each *darśana* includes general remarks on its most characteristic features, vested or unconscious interests, and historiography; the chronology and stratigraphy of its textual history (including materials drawn from unedited manuscripts!); a systematic account of its main tenets: the four *pramāṇa*s, the sixteen *tattva*s and the five-membered inference of the Nyāya (pp. 33–56; the chapter includes an outline of Navyanyāya, pp. 54–56); the six (or ten) *padārtha*s of the Vaiśeṣika (pp. 57–75); the evolutionary scheme of the Sāṅkhya, including its (epic and non-epic) prehistory, *satkārya-* and *pariṇāma-vāda* (pp. 76–90); the "therapeutic paradigm" of Yoga and its doctrinal differences with Sāṅkhya (pp. 91–101; "I have been strongly tempted to omit any treatment of Yoga in a work [. . .] devoted essentially to the 'philosophy' of India," p. 91); Mīmāṃsā (pp. 102–8; the main doctrinal and apologetic concerns of Mīmāṃsā are dealt with in excursus III and IV); the Vedānta(s) of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Śrīharṣa, and Vijñānabhikṣu (pp. 109–16); the Pratyabhijñā (pp. 117–20, presented further in appendix 2); the minimalist epistemology and the hedonistic ethics of the Lokāyatas (pp. 121–25); Jaina epistemology, logic, *anekānta-* and *naya-vāda* (pp. 126–36); the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika doctrines of *dharma*s, causality, and existence (pp. 139–45); the "instantaneist" ontology and the gnoseology of the Sautrāntikas (pp. 145–48); the Mādhyamika attitude toward emptiness, theses, the two truths, and *prasaṅga*s (pp. 148–53); the *ālayavijñāna*, the three natures/characteristics, and the idealism(s) of Yogācāra (pp. 153–57); Dignāga's ideas on the two *pramāṇa*s (including the distinction between *svārtha-* and *parārtha-anumāna* and the issue of *pramāṇaphala*) and the *apoha*

theory (pp. 159–65); Dharmakīrti's thought (definition of *pramāṇa*, *svabhāvapratibandha*, scriptural authority, pp. 165–71).

Several key items in the presentation of the *darśana*s provide opportunities to dive into "cross-system(at)ic" issues: Sanskrit and nominal style (pp. 54–56), debate and methodology (pp. 33–35), universals (pp. 71–73), *yogipratyakṣa* (pp. 95–100), and the "therapeutic paradigm" at stake in Nyāya, Āyurveda, Yoga, and Buddhism (pp. 94–95). This inclination is further strengthened by the extremely useful excursus on the form of philosophical literature (*sūtra*, *vṛtti*, *vārttika*, *bhāṣya,* and the "metaphysics" of commentary), logic (inductive vs deductive), epistemic validity (*svataḥ*- and *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*, error, *khyāti*s), linguistic speculations (conventionalism, word denotation, sentence meaning, *śābdabodha*, *abhihitānvaya* vs. *anvitābhidhāna*). Finally, appendix 1 is likely to provide one of the best discussions to date on the issues of literacy, (the normative attitudes regarding) orality and writing, and the accessibility and diffusion of knowledge in Indian philosophy. "The exaltation of orality [. . .] at the levels found in Brahmanic India reveals that its nature is, as it were, not primary, i.e., instrumental to the grandiose and refined cultural and social control strategy put into effect by the Brahmanic élite. The brahmins, numerically overwhelmed by their (cultural) subjects, were bound to create a rigidly pyramidal structure, continually restating, through the need for oral—and hence personal—reception of Vedic knowledge, their irreplaceable function" (p. 208). On p. 209 he speaks of the brahmins' "deification of orality so as to hold on to a monopoly of knowledge." To put it briefly, one of Torella's achievements is to present the most significant "systems" as developing at the crossroads of vertical-traditional-commentarial and horizontal-cultural-polemical lines. This amounts to saying that the author succeeds in providing a picture of Indian philosophy *from within*, taking into consideration its cultural, ideological, social, and even material parameters without indulging in any form of comparative or "analytically" oriented approach (this is meant as a compliment).

Very few topics and attitudes characteristic of Indian philosophical texts are left out of consideration. The book contains hardly any errors and will no doubt be recommended as the best introduction to date to anyone interested in Indian philosophy—including specialists, who will not fail to be impressed by Torella's astounding erudition, his breadth of perspective, and the many gems unearthed by him in all layers of Indian philosophical traditions. Instead of blaming the author for this and that, as a *loi du genre* would recommend, let me suggest a few things that he might consider adding in the next edition of his book. First, one might expect a discussion of the question of the origin(s) of philosophy in India (but see p. 17 n. 10 and pp. 48–49). Second, and in spite of his explicit program in this book, the author might address the question of the very "confessionality" and apologetic concerns of Indian philosophers—a question with a strong bearing on the nature of Indian philosophy itself: what would have been the fate of Western philosophy if Jews, Muslims, and Christians had maintained themselves throughout European history and continued the critical/apologetic dialogue initiated in early medieval Spain? Third, a few words would certainly not be out of place concerning the defining (but also changing) features of "orthodoxy" both before and after the rise of Islam in India. Finally, the bibliography might be updated in order to include a few major contributions to Indian philosophy, among which are Kei Kataoka's *Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing* (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2011), Andrew Nicholson's *Unifying Hinduism* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 2010), and Isabelle Ratié's *Le Soi et l'Autre* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

Following is the reviewer's tiny contribution to the next edition of this outstanding book: Ānandagīri > Ānandagiri (p. 28 n. 22); Navanyāya > Navyanyāya (pp. 37–38); consists > consist (p. 38); vitaṇḍa > vitaṇḍā (p. 41); endowed-with-fire > endowed-with-smoke (p. 50); buddyapekṣa > buddhyapekṣa (p. 73); n.43 >n.3 (p. 82); karma > karman (passim); °mārtāṇḍa > °mārtaṇḍa (p. 93); Nyāyābhāṣya > Nyāyabhāṣya (p. 95); āṛṣa > ārṣa (p. 98); Mīmāṃsa > Mīmāṃsā (pp. 104–5); an nth > another (p. 110); Chandogya > Chāndogya (pp. 110–11); Madhyamakahṛdaya IV.56ab > Madhyamakahṛdaya VIII.56ab (p. 110); Āryaśālistambhasūtra > Āryaśālistambasūtra (p. 138); correligionaries > coreligionaries (p. 138 n. 2); Sthāviras > Sthaviras (p. 141); Dhammasaṅgani > Dhammasaṅgaṇi (p. 140); note that a Sanskrit manuscript of Sthiramati's commentary on the AKBh is now available (p. 142); (inference of real existence) > (inference [of momentariness] out of [real] existence) (p. 147 n. 9); Tarkajvalā > Tarkajvālā (p. 150); Tson kha pa > Tsoṅ/Tsong kha pa (p. 153); Āsaṅga > Asaṅga (p. 155); note that neither of the

two treatises has survived in Tibetan translation; note also that Vasubandhu allows three (and not only two) *pramāṇa*s in his AKBh and *Vyākhyāyukti* (p. 158); dvyābhāsam > dvyābhāsa (p. 164); Tārānātha > Tāranātha (p. 165 n. 32); in "This is a tree, because it is an oak," the two concepts are *not* co-extensive (p. 169); Śākyamati > Śākyabuddhi (p. 169 n. 39); Mālīnīślokavārttika > Mālinīślokavārttika (p. 175); (Madhyamā, 'Median [Voice]' > (Madhyamā, 'Median [Voice]') (p. 179); Mills' > Mill's (p. 181); Prabhākara > Prābhākara (p. 195); Lariviére > Lariviere (p. 198 n. 3); Mahābhaṣya > Mahābhāṣya (p. 199); model > modèle (p. 291 n. 10).

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A Dictionary of Pali, pt. 2: g–n. By Margaret Cone. Bristol: Pali Text Society, 2010. Pp. x + 653. £40.

A Critical Pali Dictionary, vol. 3, fasc. 8, kāmadhātu–kāreti. Edited by Oskar von Hinüber). Bristol: Pali Text Society, 2011. Pp. xv–xxxvii + 387–474. £15.

In *JAOS* 123.3 (2003): 687–90, it was my privilege to celebrate the publication of part 1 of Margaret Cone's new *Dictionary of Pali* (= DOP). There is no need to repeat here the remarks about the history of Pali lexicography made in the earlier review. But one can repeat the celebration: this is another landmark in the study of Pali, a required reference tool for anyone working on Pali texts, at whatever level. Part 2 has author and title details on the front cover as well as the spine as was the case with part 1, and—a most welcome addition—running heads at the top of pages, which makes it easier to use than part 1. Part 2 has a list of addenda to part 1 (pp. 645–53). Many of the entries are major research contributions, with many centrally important terms: part 1, for example, has long and extremely useful entries on *kamma* and related terms; part 2 has entries on *dhamma* and *nibbāna*. Dr. Cone has been working on the dictionary since 1984. At the time of writing this review, I gather (October 2011) she has reached the letter *p* (s.v. *parama*). Let us hope that part 3 will be published in the not-too-distant future.

In the previous review I mentioned the *Critical Pali Dictionary* (= CPD), begun in 1926 (not 1924 as is stated on the title page), which had at the time of that writing reached vol. 3, fasc. 6, to *kasāvacuṇṇa*, published by the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters. The year 2001 saw the appearance of vol. 3, fasc. 7, *kasāvacuṇṇa-kāmadhātu*, then published by the Department of Asian Studies, University of Copenhagen, reviewed in *JAOS* 123.4 (2003): 932. 2011 brought the appearance of volume 3, fasc. 8, *kāmadhātu-kāreti*, now published by the Pali Text Society. Here the tone must be elegiac as well as celebratory, for this will be the last fascicule to appear: CPD has now come to an end. The entire CPD to date is available in hard copy from the Pali Text Society: see http://www.palitext.com; entries from all fascicules up to the penultimate (vol. 3, fasc. 6) are also available on-line at http://pali.hum.ku.dk/cpd/. (This site also contains the prefaces to the three volumes, abbreviations, obituaries, and other useful material.) The introductory materials to three separate fascicules of volume 3 give the recent history of CPD, with details of the contributors: readers should note that of the prefatory pages (in roman numerals) to volume 3, pages i–vi are in fascicule 1, pp. vii–xiv in fascicule 7, and pp. xv–xxxvii in fascicule 8, as is the contents page for volume 3 as a whole. Anyone binding the fascicules of volume 3 together should take note of this. At the end of the fascicule (pp. 469–74) is a list of additions and corrections to volume 3 as a whole. Of the two dictionaries, CPD is for the most part fuller, quantitatively: the entry for the simple verb *karoti*, 'to do', for instance, occurs in volume 3, fasc. 6, pp. 301–14, with twenty-six columns of entries, while the causative forms *kārayati*, *kārāpeti*, and *kāreti* have separate entries in fasc. 8, pp. 453–55 (six columns), pp. 456–58 (four columns), and pp. 464–67 (seven columns) respectively. DOP has both simple and causative forms of the verb together under *karoti*, pp. 646–53 (just over thirteen columns). Both have various derivatives of √*kṛ* under separate headings. CPD does not end with *kāreti*, despite the cover page: the last entry is

PREFACE

Deciding to reprint a book without changes after ten years from its second revised edition might mean two different things: a) the author has stopped working on the subject; or b) the author considers his book to be perfect. In the present case, however, none of the two options hold, for a) the Pratyabhijñā has never ceased to be one of my favourite subjects of research; b) I am well aware that any truly scientific work is intrinsically provisional.
The book gestated over a long period: it was the first time that a seminal text of the extraordinary tradition of non-dual Śaivism was edited critically and its translation supported by copious annotations covering both the philological and philosophical side. I dare say that after its publication it became clear that no serious study of Pratyabhijñā philosophy could be carried out without taking into account the complex relationship of its tenets with the main lines of Indian philosophy as a whole, particularly Dharmakīrti and the epistemological school of Buddhism, Bhartṛhari, Mīmāṃsā and the other major darśanas, aesthetic speculation. In other words, that the time when Śaiva advaita philosophy was studied by focusing exclusively, or nearly exclusively, on Śaiva sources was definitively over.
Among the recent contributions to Pratyabhijñā (and Śaiva advaita) studies stand out those by Isabelle Ratié, Alexis Sanderson and Raffaele Torella, which are listed in the following Additional Bibliography. My recent discovery of a relatively long fragment of Utpaladeva's extended commentary (Vivṛti or Ṭīkā) on his ĪPK and Vṛtti, running from I.3.6 through I.5.3, deserves a special mention. After looking into the edition and English translation of this extremely important text, published in several articles from 2007 onwards (see Additional Bibliography: TORELLA 2007 a, b, c, d; TORELLA forthcoming a), we are no longer allowed to consider Utpaladeva a mere predecessor of Abhinavagupta - as being the latter the great master of Pratyabhijñā - but rather, we must take Utpaladeva, particularly with his Vivṛti, as the real centre of gravity of the system, and Abhinavagupta mainly as his brilliant commentator.[1] Instead of including this additional material into the body of the present book, which in the generous opinion of the scholarly world keeps its validity intact (even several years on from its original publication), I have preferred to refer the interested reader to the above articles themselves, which moreover will soon take the shape of a unitary volume.

Raffaele Torella

Rocca Priora, January 2012

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[1] In August 2010 the first international workshop entirely devoted to Utpaladeva took place in Shimla ("Utpaladeva, philosopher of Recognition"), organised by Bettina Bäumer and myself, under the auspices of the Indian Institute for Advanced Study. The Proceedings will be published within 2012.